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ABSTRACT
Transnational corporations (TNCs) not only occupy an important
status as economic actors on the international scene, but they are also
political actors who are increasingly involved in the progressive
development and enforcement of the regulatory structures of the
international economic system. Against this background, this article
focuses on the current status and potential future development of TNCs
as steering subjects in international economic law (IEL). It evaluates the
role played by this category of nonstate actors in two of the central public
international law fields of IEL, namely the legal order of the World
Trade Organization (WTO) and the international regime on the
protection of foreign investments. Based on this evaluation, this article
argues that the multilateral framework of world trade law, on the one
side, and international investment law, on the other side, serve as
notable "reference fields" for two competing approaches to the
incorporation of TNCs in the regulatory practice of the global economic
system and thus to their position as steering subjects in the framework of
IEL as a whole. In light of these findings, this article provides some
broader conceptual thoughts on the normative guiding vision of an
emerging transnational economic community as an analytical
framework for assessing the future development of TNCs as steering
subjects in the international economic realm.
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INTRODUCTION
From a sociological perspective, the global economic system has
always been and is currently ever more so characterized by a
configuration of the relations and interactions not only of states, but
also, first and foremost, various categories of nonstate actors involved in
transnational economic transactions.' In particular, the currently more
than 82,000 TNCs in the world hold quite a prominent position among
the relevant nonstate actors.2 Their status as influential participants in
international economic relations and "driving forces" of the processes of
globalization is vividly illustrated by the fact that foreign investment-a
constitutive activity of TNCsa-is now a key component of the global
economic system.4
Given their important role as economic actors on the international
scene, it is hardly surprising that TNCs also developed a particular
interest in the normative framework governing their economic
activities. They influence the respective domestic legal regimes of states
by taking advantage of the differences in territorial regulation in their
business decisions on where to make investments, how to disperse their
assets, and choosing the suitable legal framework for their
transactions.5 In addition, however, as now increasingly analyzed and
acknowledged in the legal literature,6 TNCs are also involved in the
1. See, e.g., Panel Report, United States-Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974,
7.76, WT/DS152/R (Dec. 22, 1999) [hereinafter Section 301 Panel Report] ("The
multilateral trading system is, per force, composed not only of States but also, indeed
mostly, of individual economic operators."); ZACHARY DOUGLAS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW
OF INVESTMENT CLAIMS 7 (2009).
2. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment Report
2009: Transnational Corporations, Agricultural Production and Development 17, 222-24,
UNCTAD/WIR/2009/Corr.1 (Oct. 26, 2009). On the distinctive features of and challenges
arising from the activities of TNCs as compared to other business actors, see, for example,
Joseph E. Stiglitz, Regulating Multinational Corporations: Towards Principles of Cross-
Border Legal Frameworks in a Globalized World Balancing Rights and Responsibilities, 23
AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 451, 474-81 (2008).
3. On the definition of TNCs, including the controversies and challenges connected
with this issue, see PETER T. MUCHLINSKI, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND THE LAW 5-8
(2d ed. 2007).
4. RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW 2 (2008). For a discussion on the economic importance of TNCs, see
generally United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, The Universe of the
Largest Transnational Corporations, UNCTAD/ITE/ILA/2007/2 (2007).
5. See Larry Cati Backer, Multinational Corporations as Objects and Sources of
Transnational Regulation, 14 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 499, 503-08 (2008).
6. On the different subjects and successive phases of analysis in this regard, see
generally Anne Peters, Lucy Koechlin & Gretta Fenner Zinkernagel, Non-State Actors as
Standard Setters: Framing the Issue in an Interdisciplinary Fashion, in NON-STATE
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progressive development and enforcement of the regulatory structure of
the international economic system itself.
Against this background, this article focuses on some notable
aspects of the current status and potential future development of TNCs
as "steering subjects" in IEL. The term "steering subjects" -- in
particular to be distinguished from and considerably broader than the
generally recognized circle of subjects of international law-comprises
all state, substate, intergovernmental, nonstate, and intermediate
actors that participate in the creation and development of IEL and in
the respective law-realization processes7 aimed at the enforcement of its
rules of behavior.
It needs to be emphasized that the issue of TNCs as steering
subjects in IEL is far too broad a topic to be comprehensively discussed
in a single contribution. This perception results from the fact that the
appropriate notional and dogmatic conceptualization of the regulatory
mechanisms governing the interactions in the global economic system
have already for some time been subject to a controversial debate in the
literature. Given that even the meaning of "economic law" is still
disputed, it is hardly surprising that so far no general agreement has
been reached with regard to the scope of the application of the term
"IEL,"8 traditionally the most commonly used expression for the
normative structure of the international economic system. While some
still adhere to the view that IEL should be limited to the rules of public
ACTORS AS STANDARD SETTERS 1, 4-5 (Anne Peters et al. eds., 2009) ("[Slome international
lawyers have studied the legal role of business actors as authors or co-producers of norms.
A traditional field of interest for contract lawyers has been the so-called lex mercatoria,
whose probldmatique was in the 1990s linked to the globalisation debate. A different
strand of legal scholarship, notably in the 1970s and 1980s, examined state contracts
between firms and states. Later, lawyers have taken an interest in corporate self-
regulation in the form of codes of conduct, often in the context of corporate social
responsibility and corporate citizenship. Legal scholars have barely analysed the
elaboration of technical or product standards by industrial sectors, professional
associations, technical experts and government officials. The role of transnational
corporations (TNCs) as formants of ordinary international hard law has been studied only
recently.").
7. Generally on the notion of "law-realization" as distinct from the considerably
narrower term "law-enforcement," see in particular CHRISTIAN TIETJE,
INTERNATIONALISIERTES VERWALTUNGSHANDELN 264-78 (2001); CHRISTIAN TIETJE,
NORMATIVE GRUNDSTRUKTUREN DER BEHANDLUNG NICHT'TARIFAERER
HANDELSHEMMNISSE IN DER WTO/GATT-RECHTSORDNUNG 132-35 (1998).
8. See, e.g., Detlev F. Vagts, International Economic Law and the American Journal of
International Law, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 769 (2006); JOHN H. JACKSON, Economic Law,
International, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 20 (Rudolf Bernhardt
ed., 1995); AsIF H. QURESHI & ANDREAS R. ZIEGLER, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 7 (2d
ed. 2007).
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international law dealing with transboundary economic relations,9 it
has frequently been stressed that IEL is in fact characterized by an
interconnection of various different areas and means of regulation that
transcend the traditional distinctions between international and
domestic law, as well as between public and private law.'0 Furthermore,
the legal literature has identified and comprehensively analyzed the
phenomenon of the so-called law merchant or lex mercatoria, an
autonomous body of regulations that private economic actors created
and independently enforced to govern their international trade and
financial relations without the involvement of states."
However, in light of the current regulatory reality in the
international economic system, it becomes more and more obvious that
neither the traditional three-sided differentiation between public
international law, domestic law, and the lex mercatoria, nor the above-
mentioned broader understanding of IEL can be regarded as a
conceptual approach adequately describing the characteristics of the
normatively relevant rules of behavior governing transboundary
economic relations. IEL-in the same way as the normative structure of
the international system as a whole-indicates the evolution of a
functional unity between international and domestic law. In addition, it
first and foremost comprises an interconnected plurality of various
other normatively relevant steering mechanisms, including
international standards, codes of conducts, and intermediate, as well as
private, regulatory regimes.
Therefore, the former distinction between "hard law" and the
diverse nonbinding regulatory instruments is increasingly blurred.
9. See PIETER VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 9 (1981); IGNAZ SEIDI-HOHENVELDERN, INTERNATIONAL
EcoNOMIC LAW 1 (3d ed. 1999); HERCULES BOOYSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL
TRADE LAW AS A MONISTIC LEGAL SYSTEM 9 (2003); Jeffery Atik, Uncorking International
Trade, Filling the Cup of International Economic Law, 15 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1231, 1234
(2000); Georg Schwarzenberger, The Principles and Standards of International Economic
Law, 117 RECUEIL DES COURS, no. 1, 1966 at 1, 7.
10. See, e.g., Federico Ortino & Matteo Ortino, Law of the Global Economy: In Need of
a New Methodological Approach?, in INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: THE STATE AND
FUTURE OF THE DISCIPLINE 89 (Colin B. Picker et al. eds., 2008); Peter Fischer, Das
Internationale Wirtschaftsrecht - Versuch einer Systematisierung, 19 GER. Y.B. INT'L L.
143 (1976); MARKUS KRAJEWSKI, WIRTSCHAFTSVOELKERRECHT 2 (2d ed. 2009); GEORG
ERLER, GRUNDPROBLEME DES INTERNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFTSRECHTS (1956).
11. From the numerous literature on this phenomenon see, e.g., Filip De Ly, Lex
Mercatoria (New Law Merchant): Globalisation and International Self-Regulation, in
RULES AND NETWORKS: THE LEGAL CULTURE OF GLOBAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 159
(Richard P. Appelbaum et al. eds., 2001); Hans-Joachim Mertens, Lex Mercatoria: A Self-
Applying System Beyond National Law?, in GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT A STATE 31 (Gunther
Teubner ed., 1997).
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Transboundary economic relations, irrespective of whether they are of a
more public or exclusively private nature, are, in a normative sense,
thus ever more determined by what can most appropriately be described
as a network of various regulatory instruments resulting from
cooperative efforts of governmental, intermediate, and nongovernmental
entities, notably among them also TNCs.12
That said, and in light of this complex regulatory reality in the
international economic system as well as the manifold involvement of
TNCs therein, it hardly needs to be emphasized that it will not be
possible to elaborate on all the aspects and implications arising from
this issue in a comprehensive way. Rather, this article largely confines
itself to evaluating the role TNCs play as steering subjects in two of the
central public international law fields of IEL, namely the legal order of
the WTO, as discussed in part I, and the international legal regime on
the protection of foreign investments, as discussed in part II. Far from
merely giving credit to the complexity of the issue, the narrower focus of
the present analysis is justified in light of the fact that the findings
made regarding these two legal areas will at the same time reveal
important broader implications for the future prospects concerning the
status of TNCs in the other normatively relevant steering mechanisms
of the international economic order. This article argues that the
multilateral framework of world trade law, on the one side, and
international investment law, on the other side, serve as notable
"reference fields"13 for two competing approaches to the incorporation of
TNCs in the regulatory practice of the global economic system and thus
to their position as steering subjects in the framework of IEL as a
whole. Against this background, this article also provides some broader
conceptual thoughts on the normative guiding vision of an emerging
transnational economic community as an analytical framework for
assessing the future development of TNCs as steering subjects in the
international economic realm, as discussed in part III.
12. For a more in-depth evaluation of this proposition, see Christian Tietje & Karsten
Nowrot, Laying Conceptual Ghosts of the Past to Rest: The Rise of Philip C. Jessup's
Transnational Economic System, in PHILIP C. JESSUP'S TRANSNATIONAL LAW REVISITED -
ON THE OCCASION OF THE 50TH ANNIVERSARY OF ITS PUBLICATION 17, 19-25 (Christian
Tietje et al. eds., 2006). On the participation of TNCs in the various and diverse
normatively relevant steering mechanisms in the global economic system, see KARSTEN
NOwIOT, NORMATIVE ORDNUNGSSTRUKTUR UND PRIVATE WIRKUNGSMACHT 217-422
(2006); STEPHEN TULLY, CORPORATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAWMAKING 52-304 (2007).
13. On the recourse to reference fields as a dogmatic approach to the identification of
general legal principles and concepts, see Andreas VoBkuhle, The Reform Approach in the
German Science of Administrative Law: The 'Neue Verwaltungsrechtswissenschaft,' in THE
TRANSFORMATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN EUROPE 89, 138-40 (Matthias Ruffert ed.,
2007).
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I. TNCS AS STEERING SUBJECTS IN THE WTO LEGAL ORDER
At the multilateral level, the present public international legal
framework on trade in goods and services is essentially codified in the
numerous agreements annexed to the Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization. 14 The legal order of the WTO is
fundamentally aimed at ensuring legal certainty in international trade
as a necessary prerequisite "to create the predictability needed to plan
future trade"'5 and for the optimal allocation of economic resources by
its at present 153 members and in particular, also by private business
actors, to achieve the welfare-creating effects of international economic
relations.' 6 Given that WTO law is thus also intended to benefit and
protect private business activities,' 7 it appears only natural that TNCs
have, in general, always displayed a strong interest in this international
organization and its activities.' 8 Identifying the main characteristics of
the position previously and currently enjoyed by TNCs as steering
subjects in this regard thereby involves an evaluation of three
different-albeit interrelated-dimensions: the involvement of these
actors in the creation of the WTO and its subsequent development; their
participation in dispute settlement processes; and, finally, the legal
status of TNCs in the realm of WTO law.
A. Formation of and Participation in the WTO
The first dimension that needs to be evaluated in order to assess
and clarify the status occupied by TNCs as steering subjects in the WTO
legal order concerns two perspectives: (1) the involvement of this type of
nonstate actors in the creation of this international organization; and
14. For a comprehensive account of the historical development as well as the
institutional and substantive structures of the WTO legal order, see generally MITSUO
MATSUSHITA, THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM & PETRO C. MAVROIDIS, THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION: LAW, PRACTICE, AND POLICY (2d ed. 2006).
15. Report of the Panel, United States-Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported
Substances, 5.2.2, L/6175 (June 5, 1987), GATT B.I.S.D. (34th Supp.) at 136, 153 (1988).
16. See, e.g., Section 301 Panel Report, supra note 1, TT 7.75-.77.
17. See id. 7.73.
18. However, on the perception that the respective corporate interest in and
engagement with the WTO has, for a variety of reasons, declined in recent years while
business actors have focused increasingly on the promotion of regional trade agreements,
see BERNARD M. HOEKMAN & MICHEL M. KOSTECKI, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE
WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: THE WTO AND BEYOND 643-44 (3d ed. 2009). Concerning the
respective consequences for the current Doha Round negotiations, see id. at 644
("Whatever the reasons, the lack of vigorous support by business for the Doha Round was
a significant factor in the lack of progress that was achieved.").
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(2) their subsequent participation in the decision-making processes of
the WTO.
1. Creation of the WTO
The strong interest and involvement of TNCs in the legal regime of
the WTO can be traced back further than its entering into force on
January 1, 1995. Already at the forefront of the launch of the Uruguay
Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1947) in
September 1986 and during the subsequent negotiations, which
ultimately led to the creation of this international organization, many of
these business actors were actively involved in the formation of the
agreements constituting the WTO legal order.
A vivid and well researched example is the evolution of the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS). It has been argued that the adoption of TRIPS can ultimately
be retraced to the concerted efforts of only thirteen TNCs.19 While such
a perception is most certainly an oversimplification, given the various
relevant factors in the Uruguay Round negotiations, the underlying
empirical evidence indicates TNCs exercised a considerable influence in
the drafting history of TRIPS.20 Experiencing the structural deficits of
the traditional international regime on the protection of intellectual
property, U.S.-based TNCs in particular started to advocate the
adoption of a more effective legal framework by the late 1970s. 21 More
coordinated and thus more effective efforts began in 1984 with the
establishment of the International Intellectual Property Alliance (IIPA),
comprised of eight trade associations representing more than 1,500
companies, 22 and continued in March 1986 with the formation of an ad
hoc coalition of thirteen U.S.-based TNCs under the Intellectual
Property Committee (IPC).23 Following meetings of IPC representatives
19. See Susan K. Sell, Multinational Corporations as Agents of Change: The
Globalization of Intellectual Property Rights, in PRIVATE AUTHORITY AND INTERNATIONAL
AFFAIRS 169 (A. Clair Cutler et al. eds., 1999); e.g., PETER DRAHOS & JOHN BRAITHWAITE,
INFORMATION FEUDALISM: WHO OWNS THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY? 10 (2002) (quoting a
"senior US trade negotiator" stating in 1994 that "probably less than 50 people were
responsible for TRIPS").
20. E.g., NOWROT, supra note 12, at 218-29 (citing numerous further references).
21. See NOWROT, supra note 12, at 218-27.
22. For a general discussion on the IIPA, see DRAHOS & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 19,
at 91-92; Susan K. Sell, TRIPS and the Access to Medicines Campaign, 20 WIS. INT'L L.J.
481, 485-86 (2002).
23. Generally thereto as well as with regard to the participating TNCs, see DUNCAN
MATIHEWS, GLOBALISING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 20
INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 18:2
with corporations and business associations from Europe and Japan
aimed at coordinating their joint efforts, the success of the lobbying
activities eventually materialized in the decision by the Contracting
Parties of GATT 1947-against considerable resistance by a number of
states-to include the issue of the protection of intellectual property
rights in the negotiation mandate of the Uruguay Round. 24
Although TNCs are neither able to become parties to traditional
international agreementS25 nor did they enjoy any formal status in
deliberations during the Uruguay Round, it is generally recognized that
these nonstate actors also subsequently exercised an often "decisive
influence on the course of the negotiations" on TRIPS26 by way of, inter
alia, their representatives accompanying state delegations as advisors,
providing draft texts of the agreement to negotiators, and lobbying
activities at the international and in particular domestic level of the
Contracting Parties of GATT 1947.27 Quite comparable intensive
involvements of TNCs in the Uruguay Round have also been identified,
for example, in connection with the negotiations on the General
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)28 as well as eventually with
regard to securing the approval of the Agreement Establishing the
WTO-in light of the "Great 1994 Sovereignty Debate"29 being far from
certain-by both houses of the U.S. Congress in November and
December 1994.30
(2002); MICHAEL P. RYAN, KNOWLEDGE DIPLOMACY: GLOBAL COMPETITION AND THE
POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 69 (1998).
24. See NOWROT, supra note 12, at 226-27.
25. On the controversial issue of so-called "state contracts" in the realm of
international investment law, see infra Part II. A.
26. DRAHOS & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 19, at 123.
27. Peter Drahos, Negotiating Intellectual Property Rights: Between Coercion and
Dialogue, in GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: KNOWLEDGE, ACCESS AND
DEVELOPMENT 161, 172 (Peter Drahos & Ruth Mayne eds., 2002) ("From 1990 onwards
the main issue to be decided was how far an agreement on intellectual property would
deviate from the blueprint that had been provided to the negotiators by Pfizer, IBM, Du
Pont and other members of the international business community in the form of a draft
proposal. ). On the respective involvement of TNCs, see NOWROT, supra note 12, at
227-29.
28. Susan K. Sell, Big Business and the New Trade Agreements: The Future of the
WTO?, in POLITICAL ECONOMY AND THE CHANGING GLOBAL ORDER 174 (Richard Stubbs &
Geoffrey R.D. Underhill eds., 2d ed. 2000); TULLY, supra note 12, at 158-59.
29. See generally John H. Jackson, The Great 1994 Sovereignty Debate: United States
Acceptance and Implementation of the Uruguay Round Results, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNATL
L. 157 (1997) (discussing the 1994 debate in Congress about whether the United States
should ratify the treaty negotiated at the Uruguay Round).
30. See, e.g., PHILIP A. MuNDO, NATIONAL POLITICS IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY: THE
DOMESTIC SOURCES OF U.S. TRADE POLICY 136-37 (1999).
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Already the extent to and means by which TNCs participated in the
negotiations and decision-making processes leading to the creation of
the WTO allow for two important findings on their position as steering
subjects in this area of IEL. First, although certainly far from having
always succeeded in their efforts, 31 these private actors are, in general,
often able to exercise considerable influence on the adoption and content
of international agreements,32 thereby substantially contributing to the
phenomenon of an at least "partial privatisation of economic diplomacy"
also in the area of world trade law.33 Second, however, in the course of
their participation in these law-making processes, TNCs usually do not
enjoy any formal status. Rather, their involvement is largely
characterized by informal, unofficial means and actions directed at
governmental and intergovernmental actors on the international scene,
as well as lobbying activities at the domestic level. 34
2. Decision-Making Processes in the WTO
An overall quite similar picture emerges from an evaluation of
TNCs' involvement in the decision-making processes of the WTO.
Individual private business actors do not benefit from any direct, legally
recognized status in this regard. The only formal venue for participation
is through the guise of their business associations on the basis of Article
V:2 of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the WTO. This provision
states that the General Council "may make appropriate arrangements
for consultation and cooperation with non-governmental organizations
31. For example, in connection with the Uruguay Round, see the rather disappointing
outcome (from the perspective of TNCs) of the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment
Measures (TRIMs). General Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1868
U.N.T.S. 186. On the regulatory structure and content of this agreement, see, for example,
MATSUSHITA, SCHOENBAUM & MAVROIDIS, supra note 14, at 838-49. With regard to the
involvement of TNCs in the respective negotiations, see Sell, supra note 28, at 179-80.
32. On the creation of the WTO legal order, see Sylvia Ostry, What are the Necessary
Ingredients for the World Trading Order?, in GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: AN ARCHITECTURE
FOR THE WORLD EcONOMY 123, 124-25 (Horst Siebert ed., 2003) ("The activism paid off
and it's fair to say that American MNEs [multinational enterprises] played a key-
perhaps even the key-role in establishing the new global trading system.").
33. Nicolas Bayne & Stephen Woolcock, Economic Diplomacy in the 2000s, in THE NEW
ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY: DECISION-MAKING AND NEGOTIATION IN INTERNATIONAL
EcONOMIC RELATIONS 287, 295 (Nicolas Bayne & Stephen Woolcock eds., 2003).
34. See Anne Peters, Till Forster & Lucy Koechlin, Towards Non-State Actors as
Effective, Legitimate, and Accountable Standard Setters, in NON-STATE ACTORS AS
STANDARD SETTERS 492, 495 (Anne Peters et al. eds., 2009).
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concerned with matters related to those of the WTO."35 The term
"nongovernmental organizations" (NGOs) thereby comprises, in the
WTO context, NGOs in the narrow sense of the meaning,36 as well as
private business organizations like the International Chamber of
Commerce.37
Nevertheless, the WTO's approach to the participatory entitlements
of these collective nonstate actors is, in general, rather restrictive,
especially if compared to the practices of other international
organizations like the United Nations.38 Based on the authorization in
Article V:2 WTO Agreement, the General Council adopted the
Guidelines for Arrangements on Relations with Non-Governmental
Organizations on July 18, 1996. In rather broad terms, these guidelines
essentially only provide for enhanced public access to WTO documents
and contain the recommendation that the WTO Secretariat should
interact with NGOs,
through various means such as inter alia the
organisation on an ad hoc basis of symposia on specific
WTO-related issues, informal arrangements to receive
the information NGOs may wish to make available for
consultation by interested delegations and the
continuation of past practice of responding to requests
for general information and briefings about the WTO.39
However, with regard to the issue of direct participation in the decision-
making processes of the WTO, the guidelines state that
Members have pointed to the special character of the
WTO, which is both a legally binding intergovernmental
35. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization art. V:2, Apr.
15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154; 33 I.L.M. 1144.
36. For more on the definition of NGOs, see generally Steve Charnovitz,
Nongovernmental Organizations and International Law, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 348, 350-52
(2006); Karsten Nowrot, Legal Consequences of Globalization: The Status of Non-
Governmental Organizations under International Law, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 579,
615-20 (1999).
37. See Karen Kaiser, Article V WTO Agreement, in WTO: INSTITUTIONS AND DISPUTE
SE'PPLEMENT 64, 72 (Rildiger Wolfrum, Peter-Tobias Stoll & Karen Kaiser eds., 2006).
38. See, e.g., John H. Jackson, The WTO 'Constitution' and Proposed Reforms: Seven
'Mantras' Revisited, 4 J. INT'L ECON. L. 67, 77 (2001); Donald McRae, The Place of the
WTO in the International System, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW
54, 66 (Daniel Bethlehem et al. eds., 2009).
39. Decision by the General Council, Guidelines for Arrangements on Relations with
Non-Governmental Organizations, T1 3, 4 WT/IL162 (July 23, 1996).
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treaty of rights and obligations among its Members and
a forum for negotiations. As a result of extensive
discussions, there is currently a broadly held view that it
would not be possible for NGOs to be directly involved in
the work of the WTO or its meetings. 40
Although the fact that nonstate actors are essentially excluded from
any direct participation in the decision-making processes of the WTO
has been subject to an intensive and controversial debate,41 it is, in light
of the fairly reserved attitude of the majority of WTO members, rather
doubtful whether respective formal opportunities for NGOs-not to
mention individual TNCs-will be enhanced considerably any time
soon. However, in order to gain a broader picture of the issue at hand,
the evaluation-again--should not confine itself to the formal
possibilities for participation. Rather, one also has to consider the
various informal means by which TNCs and their business associations
exercise an often considerable influence on individual WTO members, as
well as the outcome of WTO decision-making processes as a whole. 42
Aside from the respective lobbying activities in the internal realm of
WTO members, the indirect involvement of TNCs and business
associations in the deliberations of the WTO Committee on Trade and
Environment provides a notable example in this regard.43
In sum, in addition to the creation of the WTO, nonstate actors, in
general, and TNCs, in particular, "have long played very significant-
albeit informal and unofficial-roles" 44 in the decision-making processes
of this international organization.
40. Id. 6.
41. See, e.g., Marcos A. Orellana, WTO and Civil Society, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 38, at 671; Peter Van den Bossche, NGO
Involvement in the WTO: A Comparative Perspective, 11 J. INT'L ECON. L. 717 (2008).
42. On the significance of this indirect involvement by TNCs and other private actors
in the context of the WTO, see, for example, HOEKMAN & KOSTECKI, supra note 18, at 642-
44; NOWROT, supra note 12, at 272-75; Jeffrey L. Dunoff, The Misguided Debate over NGO
Participation at the WTO, 1 J. INT'L EcON. L. 433, 434 (1998).
43. See Gregory C. Shaffer, "If Only We Were Elephants": The Political Economy of the
WTO's Treatment of Trade and Environmental Matters, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAw: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ROBERT E. HUDEC 349, 374-75 (Daniel
L. M. Kennedy & James D. Southwick eds., 2002).
44. Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Civil Society at the WTO: The Illusion of Inclusion?, 7 ILSA J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 275, 281 (2001); see also, e.g., Oded Shenkar & Ilgaz Arikan, Business as
International Politics: Drawing Insights from Nation-State to Inter-Firm Alliances, 11
Bus. & POL., no. 4, 2009, at art. 1, 15.
INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 18:2
B. Involvement in the Dispute Settlement Mechanism
It is generally recognized that one of the central structural
components of the WTO that provides for the effectiveness and thus
success of this legal regime is its dispute settlement mechanism as
stipulated in the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing
the Settlement of Disputes (DSU).45 Thereby and in order to adequately
assess the importance to attach to the decisions of the WTO panels and
the Appellate Body, as well as of other international judicial and quasi-
judicial bodies, one should recall that in particular institutionalized
dispute resolution, such as that provided by the WTO legal order, must
be regarded not only as a means of law application and enforcement, but
also as a mechanism of law making and thus a "most important factor in
the development of international law."46
The direct participation of private actors as complainants or
defendants in WTO panel and Appellate Body proceedings is already
excluded by the fact that the relevant provisions of the DSU only refer
to WTO members, and thus make it sufficiently clear that the dispute
settlement mechanism is only open to them. 47 The same restrictions
apply to the possibilities for becoming a third party in DSU proceedings,
which are also limited to WTO members by the respective provisions of
Articles 4(11), 10(2) and 17(4) of the DSU.48 The only exception in the
WTO legal order that provides for the direct participation of individuals
and private corporations as complainant is the dispute settlement
mechanism established under Article 4 of the Agreement on
Preshipment Inspection, which, however, has not gained any practical
significance until now. 49 Aside from this unique procedure, there is
currently no possibility for TNCs to participate directly as a party or
third party in dispute settlement processes. Despite various pleas in
45. See, e.g., Valerie Hughes, The Institutional Dimension, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 38, at 269, 294 ("WTO dispute settlement
institutions have proved to be the success story of the WTO.").
46. [Vol. I, Pt. 1 Peace] OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAw 41 (Sir Robert Jennings &
Sir Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992); see also ALAN BOYLE & CHRISTINE CHINKIN, THE
MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 263-311 (2007); Joel P. Trachtman & Philip M. Moremen,
Costs and Benefits of Private Participation in WTO Dispute Settlement: Whose Right is it
Anyway?, 44 HARV. INT'L L.J. 221, 223 (2003) ("[Clontrol over litigation entails a degree of
control over the type of law that is made . . . .").
47. See also, e.g., Appellate Body Report, United States-Imposition of Countervailing
Duties on Certain Hot-Rolled Lead and Bismuth Carbon Steel Products Originating in the
United Kingdom, 40, WT/DS138/AB/R (May 10, 2000).
48. See also Appellate Body Report, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain
Shrimp and Shrimp Products, 101, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998).
49. See generally Emily Rome, Note, The Background, Requirements, and Future of the
GATT/WTO Preshipment Inspection Agreement, 7 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 469 (1998).
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favor of granting private entities standing to bring a complaint de lege
ferenda,50 the prospects for such an enhancement of their position in the
course of the ongoing negotiations on a reform of the DSU appear to be
rather remote, considering the negative attitude of a substantial
number of WTO members toward this issue.5 Consequently, it is also in
this regard of considerable importance to evaluate the current
opportunities for TNCs to participate in WTO dispute settlement
proceedings on an informal basis.
In practice, the involvement of TNCs starts already well before a
WTO member files a complaint. Indeed, in the overwhelming majority of
cases, the respective governmental authorities not only receive their
initial information on trade-restricting practices of other WTO members
from the affected private corporations, but they also often enter into
consultations with interested economic actors and business associations
prior to initiating dispute settlement proceedings. 52 While for most WTO
members these contacts only take place on an informal basis,53 the legal
systems of some members even provide institutionalized mechanisms in
this regard. The most important examples are the regulations included
in the United State's Trade Act of 1974-frequently referred to as the
"Section 301 procedure"-as well as the mechanism provided for in the
EU Trade Barriers Regulation. Although the scope of application of
these procedures is not exclusively limited to WTO dispute settlement
proceedings, both mechanisms have already served as useful tools for
various private economic actors interested in exercising influence on the
relevant public authorities-in particular the U.S. Trade Representative
and the European Commission, respectively-to initiate complaints
aimed at challenging the legality of obstacles to free trade imposed by
other WTO members.5 4 The underlying reasons for these close
interactions between public authorities and private corporations are
obvious. The experience of private corporations and the valuable
50. See, e.g., Aaron Catbagan, Rights of Action for Private Non-state Actors in the WTO
Dispute Settlement System, 37 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 279 (2009).
51. For a discussion of WTO members' skepticism see Steve Charnovitz, International
Law Weekend Proceedings: Economic and Social Actors in the World Trade Organization,
7 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 259, 270-71 (2001).
52. See James P. Durling, Rights of Access to WTO Dispute Settlement, in DUE PROCESS
IN WTO DISPUTE SEPILEMENT: 3RD YEARBOOK OF THE WTLA 141 (Philippe Ruttley et al.
eds., 2001); Chad P. Bown & Bernard M. Hoekman, WTO Dispute Settlement and the
Missing Developing Country Cases: Engaging the Private Sector, 8 J. INT'L ECON. L. 861,
868-70 (2005).
53. For an example on the situation in Japan see Hiroko Yamane, The WTO Dispute
Settlement Mechanism and Japanese Traders, 1 J. INT'L ECON. L 683 (1998).
54. On these institutionalized mechanisms as a means for private economic actors to
participate in WTO dispute settlement proceedings, see GREGORY C. SHAFFER, DEFENDING
INTERESTS: PUBLIc-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS IN WTO LITIGATION 31-64, 84-101 (2003).
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information they collect concerning trade-restricting practices often
make close cooperation between them and governmental authorities in
the initial phase of WTO dispute settlement proceedings an
indispensible component of a successful complaint. One only needs to
draw attention to the central and well documented role played by TNCs,
such as Chiquita Brands International, Eastman Kodak, and Fuji Photo
Film, in the relevant WTO dispute settlement proceedings formally
initiated by the United States against the EU55 and Japan56 to illustrate
the considerable influence TNCs exercised even during the preliminary
phase of WTO dispute settlement proceedings.
Furthermore, once a formal complaint has been raised by a WTO
member, TNCs also have various options for participating in the panel
and Appellate Body proceedings. Aside from the involvement of
interested private economic actors in the selection of panelists-as
occurred, for example, in the Kodak/Fuji case57-a notable form of
participation is the possibility of direct representation in the WTO
member's delegation in the dispute settlement proceedings. The
Appellate Body stated as early as 1997 that "we can find nothing in the
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation, ....
the DSU or the Working Procedures, nor in customary international law
or the prevailing practice of international tribunals, which prevents a
WTO Member from determining the composition of its delegation in
Appellate Body proceedings,"5 8 thus offering representatives of
corporations and their private lawyers-subject to the permission of the
55. See Panel Report, European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and
Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/R/USA (May 22, 1997). On the role of Chiquita in the
preliminary stage of these proceedings, see SHAFFER, supra note 54, at 23-4; Stefan
Ohlhoff & Hannes Schloemann, Transcending the Nation-State? Private Parties and the
Enforcement of International Trade Law, 5 MAX PLANCK U.N.Y.B. L. 675, 677 (2001) ("[It
was Chiquita which guided the hand of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) in
successfully challenging the EC's Banana import regime.").
56. See Panel Report, Japan-Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and
Paper, WT/DS441R (Mar. 31, 1998). On the various activities undertaken by Kodak and
Fuji in this preliminary phase, see Dunoff, supra note 42, at 441-48; Ernesto HernAndez-
L6pez, Recent Trends and Perspectives for Non-State Actor Participation in the World
Trade Organization Disputes, 35 J. WORLD TRADE 469, 483-85 (2001).
57. See, e.g., August Reinisch & Christina Irgel, The Participation of Non-
Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in the WTO Dispute Settlement System, 1 NON-ST.
ACTORS & INT'L L.. 127, 139 (2001).
58. Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale
and Distribution of Bananas, 1.10, WT/DS27/AB/R (Sept. 9, 1997).
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respective WTO member-an opportunity to potentially exert influence
on the proceedings, even during the oral hearings.59
However, even if private actors like TNCs are not officially
represented in member delegations, a number of informal means have
evolved by which they may support WTO members in the course of
dispute settlement proceedings, thereby potentially also exercising
influence on the outcome of the cases. Aside from the well known and
intensively debated option of submitting amicus curiae briefs,60 private
economic actors have, for example, been active in assisting WTO
members in the preparation of their written submissions. In some cases,
such as the panel proceedings of the case of Japan-Measures Affecting
Consumer Photographic Film and Paper, the involvement of interested
private economic actors even went as far as the drafting and
formulation of considerable parts of the written submissions of both the
United States and Japan.61 Furthermore, even though representatives
of Kodak and Fuji did not serve directly as advisors on the delegations
of the United States and Japan in the relevant WTO dispute settlement
proceedings, both TNCs were present in Geneva during the oral
hearings to provide additional advice.62
To summarize, the role of TNCs in the dispute settlement
mechanism basically confirms the findings made with regard to their
involvement as steering subjects in the creation of the WTO and its
decision-making processes. These nonstate actors enjoy, in practice,
various participatory options on an informal basis to assist the
particular WTO members-a development that has already been
characterized as the emergence of "public-private partnerships in WTO
59. See NOWROT, supra note 12, at 391-94. However, for a discussion of the challenges
presented in ensuring confidentiality throughout these proceedings, see Ohlhoff &
Schloemann, supra note 55, at 697-98.
60. See MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK & ROBERT HOWSE, THE REGULATION OF
INTERNATIONAL TRADE 145 (3d ed. 2005) ("perhaps the most heated controversy over WTO
dispute settlement procedures"). Specifically with regard to the recourse taken by TNCs
and business associations to this participatory option, see TULLY, supra note 12, at 248-64;
NOWROT, supra note 12, at 401-06. However, on the secondary importance attributed to
this option by many TNCs, see Robert Howse, Membership and its Privileges: The WTO,
Civil Society, and the Amicus Brief Controversy, 9 EUR. L.J. 496, 509 (2003) ("[The
powerful interests in developed countries, such as corporate interests, have means of
getting their point of view known in dispute settlement circles that do not depend on
amicus submissions.").
61. See, e.g., Dunoff, supra note 42, at 446-48; SHAFFER, supra note 54, at 46-50.
62. With regard to these informal means of involvement by private economic actors,
see Dunoff, supra note 42, at 446-48; SHAFFER, supra note 54, at 46-50.
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litigation"63-and are thus frequently in a position to influence the
initiation and the course of dispute settlement proceedings. 64 However,
aside from the submission of amicus curiae briefs, this involvement is-
at least from a formal perspective-largely dependent upon the
willingness of the respective governmental complainant, respondent, or
third party to cooperate with the interested corporations, since neither
TNCs nor other private actors benefit from any legally recognized status
in the WTO dispute settlement proceedings.
C. Legal Status in WTO Law
The present evaluation of the position TNCs enjoy as steering
subjects in the WTO legal order has revealed that this category of
private actors is quite influential but generally does not hold any
formal, legally recognized standing in the decision-making and dispute
settlement processes. In order to more comprehensively understand the
legal status-or, rather, nonstatus-of TNCs in WTO law, it is
furthermore necessary to draw attention to the issue whether this legal
regime is intended to and is capable of according rights to nonstate
actors in the internal legal systems of WTO members with the
particular consequence that private parties would have access to
domestic courts with the complaint that WTO law has been breached.
While the United States, for example, has expressly excluded the
possibility for private parties to rely on WTO law in proceedings before
U.S. domestic courts through its implementing legislation passed under
the Uruguay Round Agreements Act of 1994,65 and whereas WTO
panels have been equally cautious in their findings,66 the issue whether
WTO law is capable of having a so-called "direct effect" has been the
subject of an intensive debate with regard to a number of other WTO
members, including first and foremost the European Union. Almost four
decades ago, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) already held that
provisions of international agreements that are binding on the
European Communities could, under certain conditions, create rights on
63. SHAFFER, supra note 54; see also, e.g., Anne Peters, Global Constitutionalism in a
Nutshell, in WELTINNENRECHT-LIBER AMICORUM JosT DELBROCK 535, 543 (Klaus Dicke et
al. eds., 2005).
64. On this perception, see Robert McCorquodale, An Inclusive International Legal
System, 17 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 477, 491 (2004); TULLY, supra note 12, at 264.
65. See Uruguay Round Agreements Act of 1994 §§ 102(a)-(c), Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108
Stat. 4809 (1994); MATSUSHITA, SCHOENBAUM & MAVROIDIS, supra note 14, at 92-94.
66. See Section 301 Panel Report, supra note 1, 1 7.72 ("Neither the GATT nor the
WTO has so far been interpreted by GATT/WTO institutions as a legal order producing
direct effect.").
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which individuals may rely directly.67 In 1972, however, the court found
that these requirements were not fulfilled with regard to the former
GATT 1947 due to "the great flexibility of its provisions."68 Despite
various pleas to the contrary, the court confirmed this decision even in
light of considerable institutional changes resulting from the entry into
force of the Marrakesh Agreement. In its 1999 judgment in Portugal v.
Council, the ECJ held that although "the WTO agreements .. . differ
significantly from the provisions of GATT 1947, in particular by reason
of the strengthening of the system of safeguards and the mechanism for
resolving disputes," the WTO legal order "nevertheless accords
considerable importance to negotiation between the parties."69 Bearing
in mind that "some of the contracting parties, which are among the most
important commercial partners of the Community, have concluded from
the subject-matter and purpose of the WTO agreements that they are
not among the rules applicable by their judicial organs when reviewing
the legality of their rules of domestic law," the lack of reciprocity
resulting from an attribution of direct effect to WTO law in the
European Union's legal order "would deprive the legislative or executive
organs of the Community of the scope for manoeuvre enjoyed by their
counterparts in the Community's trading partners."70 The court has
reiterated in a number of subsequent decisions the finding that WTO
law generally lacks the capacity to directly create individual rights in
the European Union's legal order,71 and thus, the decision can be
described as firmly established case law. 72
This restrictive position conforms to the overall approach other
WTO members have adopted. Although far from being entirely
convincing in light of the clearly also individual-oriented dimension of
the WTO legal system, 73 and whereas, for example, the WTO panel in
the Section 301 Report did not consider its finding on the mere "indirect
effect" of WTO law to be necessarily the final word on this disputed
67. See Case 21-24/72, Int'l Fruit Co. v. Produktschap Voor Groenten En Fruit, 1972
E.C.R. 1219, 1 19-20, at 1227; Case 12/86, Meryem Demirel v. Stadt Schwabisch Gmiind.,
1987 E.C.R. 3719, 1 14.
68. Int'l Fruit Co., 1972 E.C.R. at 1 21, at 1227.
69. Case C-149/96, Portuguese Republic v. Council, 1999 E.C.R. 1-8395, 36, at 1-8402.
70. Id. TT 43, 46.
71. Concerning the exceptional circumstances in which WTO law may be invoked
before EU courts, see Ohlhoff & Schloemann, supra note 55, at 709-13.
72. For a more in-depth analysis of the court's position through case law, see, for
example, Marco Bronckers, From 'Direct Effect' to 'Muted Dialogue, 11 J. IN'L ECON. L.
885 (2008); Pieter J. Kuijper & Marco Bronckers, WTO Law in the European Court of
Justice, 42 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 1313 (2005).
73. See, e.g., Christian Tietje & Karsten Nowrot, Forming the Centre of a
Transnational Economic Legal Order? Thoughts on the Current and Future Position of
Non-State Actors in WTO Law, 5 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REv. 321, 327-30 (2004).
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issue, 74 the predominant practice reveals that WTO members currently
do not intend to grant TNCs, individuals, and other private entities
respective corresponding legal entitlements under domestic law. Rather,
these actors are at present merely benefiting factually from the
respective obligations of the WTO members. Consequently, also in this
regard the WTO did indeed until now "not create a new legal order the
subjects of which comprise both contracting parties or Members and
their nationals."75
II. THE POSITION OF TNCs AS STEERING SUBJECTS IN INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW
Following a decades-long period characterized by diverging
perceptions of as well as polarized debates on the content and
development of the international legal regime for the protection of
foreign investments,76 international investment law has, in particular
since the beginning of the 1990s, emerged as one of the most dynamic
and practically important fields of international law, in general, and of
IEL, in particular.77 The reasons for the considerably enhanced
normative significance of this legal regime are manifold, making it
impossible to deal with them in detail in the course of this article.
Basically, the rise of international investment law can be attributed to
three interrelated and mutually reinforcing factors. In addition to the
increased factual importance attached to foreign investments and the
overall more positive attitude of states toward this type of international
economic transaction in recent decades, a second aspect concerns the
remarkably strengthened and expanded normative framework on the
substantive standards of protection. Although-in the absence of a
comprehensive multilateral agreement-being, from a formal
perspective, a very fragmented area of IEL, the provisions on, inter alia,
expropriation, fair and equitable treatment, national treatment, most
favored nation treatment, and full protection and security as stipulated
in the numerous international investment treaties are in general largely
74. See Section 301 Panel Report, supra note 1, fj 7.72, n.661.
75. Id. The phrasing of the Panel's statement is obviously closely related to the famous
finding by the ECJ in Case 26/62, Van Gend En Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie Der
Belastingen, 1963 E.C.R. 1, 12 ("[The European Economic Community constitutes a new
legal order . .. and the subjects of which comprise not only member States but also their
nationals.. ...
76. On the different phases in the development of international investment law, see
JESWALD W. SALACUSE, THE LAW OF INVESTMENT TREATIES 78-108 (2010).
77. See DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 4, at 2.
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standardized,7 8 thus constituting a quite comprehensive core of largely
undisputed protection standards for foreign investors. Finally, the third
factor, which has undoubtedly contributed to the current importance of
international investment law, is the increased effectiveness of and
recourse to the legal regime on the settlement of international
investment disputes.79
However, aside from its significantly enhanced normative
importance in the last two decades, a further notable characteristic of
this legal regime has, in principle since medieval times, always been80
and is currently again ever more so the participation of as well as the
legal recognition enjoyed by private foreign investors, in particular also
TNCs and their predecessors,81 in the development and enforcement of
international investment law. In order to illustrate the role TNCs play
as steering subjects, it is again appropriate to focus on three different-
yet, once more interconnected--dimensions: the contribution to the
development of international investment law, participation in the
dispute settlement mechanisms, and the international legal status of
these nonstate actors in this area of IEL.
A. Contribution to the Law-Making Processes
Taking into account that the protection of foreign private investors
is generally regarded as being at least among the primary purposes
pursued by international investment law, it is hardly surprising that
TNCs, whose economic activities first and foremost involve direct
investments, have always shown a strong interest in law-making
processes. In assessing the respective participatory options for nonstate
actors like TNCs, it first has to be acknowledged that treaty law
dominates the current normative framework of international
investment law. Thereby, the already more than 2,750 bilateral
78. See, e.g., STEPHAN W. SCHILL, THE MULTILATERALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW (2009); Americo Beviglia Zampetti & Pierre Sauv4, International
Investment, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 211, 215 (Andrew
T. Guzman & Alan 0. Sykes eds., 2007).
79. See infra Part II. B.
80. For examples of the branches set up in other territories by the merchant
association of the German Hanse and the agreements made with the respective rulers for
the protection of these "foreign investments," see Tillmann Rudolf Braun, Globalization:
The Driving Force in International Investment Law, in THE BACKLASH AGAINST
INVESTMENT ARBITRATION 491, 503 (Michael Waibel et al. eds., 2010).
81. On the historical development of modern TNCs and their predecessors, see
NOWROT, supra note 12, at 99-134; Mira Wilkins, The History of Multinational Enterprise,
in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL BusINESs 3 (Alan M. Rugman & Thomas L.
Brewer eds., 2001).
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investment treaties (BITs) constitute the public international law
"backbone" of this legal regime. 82 In addition, more than 300 other
international agreements provide for investment provisions, among
them bilateral and regional economic integration agreements like
Chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and
multilateral-sectoral conventions such as the Energy Charter Treaty.83
In this context, the patterns of TNCs' participation are quite similar to
their involvement in the law-making processes of world trade law, with
these private actors playing overall influential, but largely informal and
unofficial, roles.84
However, in addition to its treaty law basis, the present regime on
the protection of foreign investments also comprises a conglomerate of
various other legal instruments and sources. Prominently among them
are agreements directly concluded by foreign investors, predominantly
TNCs, with the respective host state in connection with the undertaking
of foreign direct investments. Due to their hybrid character among the
normative steering instruments of IEL, as vividly expressed by the label
"state contracts," these agreements have received considerable attention
in legal practice and literature from the end of the nineteenth century
onward.85 Among the main issues intensively and controversially
discussed in this regard is the appropriate legal regime applicable to
these investment contracts. While in the first half of the twentieth
century it was predominantly assumed that they must necessarily have
a basis in domestic law,86 arbitration tribunals and legal scholars have
increasingly accepted and endorsed a possible "internationalization" of
these agreements since the 1950s.87 Thereby, the prerequisites an
82. See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Geneva, June 2010,
Investing in a Low-Carbon Economy, 81, UNCTAD/WIR/2010 (July 22, 2010) [hereinafter
Investing in a Low-Carbon Economy].
83. See, e.g., id. at 81-83; see generally, e.g., United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development, Geneva, Investment Provisions in Economic Integration Agreements,
UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/2005/10 (June 13, 2006); SALACUSE, supra note 76, at 97-103.
84. See, e.g., Peter Muchlinski, Policy Issues, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW 3, 7 (Peter Muchlinski et al. eds., 2008); TULLY, supra note 12, at 159-
60.
85. See, e.g., DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 4, at 72-78; MUCHLINSKI, supra note 3,
at 577-83; NOWROT, supra note 12, at 339-68.
86. See, e.g., Payment of Various Serbian Loans Issued in France (Fr. v. Yugo.), 1929
P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 20, 1 41 (July 12) ("Any contract which is not a contract between
States in their capacity as subjects of international law is based on the municipal law of
some country.").
87. The term "internationalization" was probably originally used in this context first by
F. A. Mann, The Law Governing State Contracts, 21 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 11, 19 (1944)
("[S]uper-national rules of law ... may enable and justify the parties to de-localize their
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investment contract has to fulfill to be considered "internationalized"
are still disputed. The same applies to the respective legal
consequences, in particular whether public international law, some
kinds of general principles of law, or rather an autonomous third legal
order applies to these internationalized contracts.88 Nevertheless,
although still no consensus has been reached in this regard, already the
fact that TNCs regularly conclude respective agreements with host
states at eye level illustrates their important position as direct steering
subjects in the development of international investment law.89
B. Participation in the Dispute Settlement Mechanisms
The perception that TNCs occupy a very notable status as steering
subjects in international investment law is further confirmed when
focusing on the participation of these nonstate actors in the legal regime
governing the settlement of international investment disputes.
Although the investor's home state has brought a handful of
investment-related disputes to the International Court of Justice, for
example,90 and despite the fact that at least most of the international
investment treaties also contain arbitration clauses for the settlement of
disputes between the contracting states themselves, the currently most
common mechanism in this regard is investment arbitration in the form
of mixed dispute settlement directly between host states and foreign
investors, again mainly TNCs.
This type of investment arbitration is not an entirely new
phenomenon on the international scene. Even aside from certain
predecessors in medieval times,91 and thus prior to the evolution of the
modern international system as-from an admittedly quite Eurocentric
perspective--commonly connected with the Peace Treaties of
contract and to submit it to what may be called public international law, i.e. to
internationalize it.").
88. For a more comprehensive evaluation of the respective positions and for further
references, see NOWROT, supra note 12, at 344-67.
89. See, e.g., WOLFGANG FRIEDMAN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 224 (1964); Peter Muchlinski, 'Global Bukowina' Examined: Viewing the
Multinational Enterprise as a Transnational Law-Making Community, in GLOBAL LAW
WITHOUT A STATE 79, 88 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1997).
90. See, e.g., Case Concerning Amadou Sadio Diallo, (Guinea v. Dem. Rep. Congo),
I.C.J., Preliminary Objections (May 24, 2007); Elettronica S.p.A. (ELSI) (U.S. v. It.), 1989
I.C.J. 15 (July 20); Barcelona Traction, Light, and Power Co., Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970
I.C.J. 3 (July 20); Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. (U.K v. Iran), 1952 I.C.J. 93 (July 22).
91. See, e.g., Braun, supra note 80, at 503-04.
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Westphalia in 1648,92 the modern practice of investor-state arbitration
started as early as in the 1930s.93 However, it was in particular since
the beginning of the 1990s that the general acceptance of these
proceedings and a number of structural changes resulted in an
enhanced effectiveness of, as well as recourse to, investor-state
arbitration, 94 thus ultimately leading to the current prominence of this
mechanism for the settlement of international investment disputes and
especially also a further strengthening of the position of TNCs in this
regard. Whereas respective investment disputes were previously largely
administered and decided on an ad hoc basis, increasing recourse has
more recently been taken to institutionalized forms of arbitration, in
particular on the basis of the International Centre for Settlement of
Investment Disputes (ICSID) Convention, but also, for example, under
the framework of the International Chamber of Commerce, the
Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, or-
albeit without an institutional structure-on the basis of the United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL)
Arbitration Rules.95
In addition, in recent years these developments have been
accompanied by a fundamental shift concerning the legal basis for
investor-state arbitration. In the past, the host state and the foreign
investor typically gave the necessary consent to arbitration96 by way of
an arbitration clause in a respective state contract or in the form of a
compromis concerning a dispute that has already arisen. To the
contrary, the relevant arbitration clauses are now commonly stipulated
in the international investment agreements concluded between the
home and the host states, first and foremost among them the numerous
BITs.97 As a consequence, although arbitration clauses in state contracts
92. See KARSTEN NOWROT, GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 14-15
(2004).
93. See, e.g., SALACUSE, supra note 76, at 372-74.
94. See generally DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 4, at 211-14; Stephan W. Schill,
Private Enforcement of International Investment Law: Why We Need Investor Standing in
BIT Dispute Settlement, in THE BACKLASH AGAINST INVESTMENT ARBITRATION:
PERCEPTIONS AND REALITY 29 (Michael Waibel et. al., eds., 2010) (discussing advantages
of investor-state arbitration for private investors and host states in light of the
shortcomings of traditional methods of dispute settlement such as diplomatic protection or
proceedings in domestic courts).
95. See, e.g., DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 4, at 222-29.
96. See generally Christoph Schreuer, Consent to Arbitration, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW, supra note 84, at 830.
97. See CHRISTIAN TIETJE, KARSTEN NOWROT & CLEMENS WACKERNAGEL, ONCE AND
FOREVER? THE LEGAL EFFECTS OF A DENUNCIATION OF ICSID 19 (2008).
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between the host state and the private investor are still quite common,98
during "the last 10 years most cases were brought on the basis of treaty
provisions."9 9
Already the quantitative development of investment arbitration
proceedings on the basis of the ICSID Convention,1 00 which is currently
the most important forum for the settlement of investment disputes,
vividly illustrates the considerable dynamics and effectiveness that
characterize the present international legal regime on the protection of
foreign investments. This comes as a result of the legal recognition of
direct access by investors, such as TNCs, to effective international
remedies in case of a dispute with the host state. Whereas during the
whole period from 1966-the year the ICSID Convention entered into
force-until 1993 only twenty-seven investment arbitration proceedings
took place under this framework, since 1998, on average one new case
per month has been registered with ICSID.101 As of August 2010, a total
of 200 proceedings were concluded with 124 cases still pending.102
C. Legal Status in International Investment Law
The possibility of direct access to international mixed arbitration
serves as a clear indication of the quite prominent role played by TNCs
in the enforcement processes-and thereby also the progressive
developmentl 03-of international investment law. In addition, the new
98. See Karl-Heinz Bockstiegel, Enterprise v. State: The New David and Goliath?, 23
ARB. INT'L 93, 99 (2007).
99. Christoph Schreuer, The Dynamic Evolution of the ICSID System, in THE
INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES (ICSID) -
TAKING STOCK AFTER 40 YEARS 15, 20 (Rainer Hofmann & Christian J. Tams eds., 2007).
100. The same probably applies to the development of-albeit still often confidential-
investor-state arbitrations at, for example, the International Chamber of Commerce, the
Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, the London Court of
International Arbitration or on the basis of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. See August
Reinisch, The Future of Investment Arbitration, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW FOR
THE 21ST CENTURY - ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF CHRISTOPH SCHREUER 894, 896 (Christina
Binder et. al. eds., 2009). By the end of 2009, the cumulative number of known treaty-
based investor-state arbitrations had reached 357. See Investing in a Low-Carbon
Economy, supra note 82, at 83.
101. Christian Tietje, Internationaler Investitionsrechtsschutz, in RECHTSSCHUTZ IM
OFFENTLICHEN RECHT 63, 74 (Dirk Ehlers & Friedrich Schoch eds., 2009).
102. See List of ICSID Cases, INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR SETLEMENT OF INVESTMENT
DISPUTES, http://icsid.worldbank.orgICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&action
Val=ListCases (last visited Aug. 21, 2010).
103. See BOYLE & CHINKIN, supra note 46, at 263-311; JENNINGS & WATTS, supra note
46, at 41; MUTHUCUMARASWAMY SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN
INVESTMENT 4 (3d ed. 2010) (describing specifically the respective role played by
corporations in international investment law: 'The multinational corporations themselves
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developments in the field of investor-state arbitration also illustrate the
increasing normative recognition of these nonstate actors within the
international legal framework.
It is controversial whether TNCs are able to acquire the status of
partial, derivative subjects of international law on the basis of state
contracts concluded with host states,104 but the above-mentioned
structural changes in the scheme of and legal basis for the settlement of
investment disputes indicate at least the emergence of an international
legal status in this area of IEL. Thereby, contrary to a view occasionally
found in the literature,105 the ICSID Convention itself does not support
this proposition. Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention requires the
specific additional consent of the parties to the dispute-the host state
and the investor-to establish jurisdiction of ICSID for investor-state
arbitration.106 Since the investor has therefore no unconditional legal
entitlement to initiate respective dispute settlement proceedings on the
basis of the ICSID Convention alone, it has rightly been emphasized
that this treaty itself does not amount to recognition of an international
legal personality of TNCs.107
However, a different conclusion appears to be justified in those cases
in which the host state has already given its consent to investment
arbitration on the basis of an international agreement in such a way
that it only depends on whether the investor accepts this legally binding
offer by, inter alia, instituting investment arbitration proceedings. 08 A
respective treaty-based legal entitlement to take recourse to investor-
must be seen as distinct bases of power capable of asserting their interests through the
law. . . . It is a fascinating fact that through the employment of private techniques of
dispute resolution, they are able to create principles of law that are generally favourable
to them."); Trachtman & Moremen, supra note 46, at 223.
104. See, e.g., PETER MAIANCZUK, AKEHURST'S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO
INTERNATIONAL LAW 102 (7th ed. 1997); NOWROT, supra note 12, at 367.
105. See, e.g., S.B.O. Gutto, Violation of Human Rights in the Third World:
Responsibility of States and TNCs, in THIRD WORLD ATTITUDES TOWARDS INTERNATIONAL
LAW 275,285 (Frederick E. Snyder & Surakiart Sathirathai eds., 1987).
106. See the respective statement in the preamble of the ICSID Convention that "no
Contracting State shall by the mere fact of its ratification, acceptance or approval of this
Convention and without its consent be deemed under any obligation to submit any
particular dispute to conciliation or arbitration." Convention on the Settlement of
Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States, pmbl., Apr. 10, 2006,
I.C.S.I.D. 15. For a comprehensive evaluation of the consent requirement as stipulated in
Article 25 of the ICSID Convention, see CHRISTOPH H. SCHREUER ET AL., THE ICSID
CONVENTION - A COMMENTARY 190-253 (2d ed. 2009).
107. See, e.g., Christian Tietje, The Law Governing the Settlement of International
Investment Disputes, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT PROTECTION AND ARBITRATION 17, 32
(Christian Tietje ed., 2008).
108. See, e.g., Generation Ukraine Inc. v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/9, Award, 11
12.2 (Sept. 16, 2003) (discussing the admissibility of this approach).
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state arbitration-and thus the allocation of direct subjective rights to
private investors under international law' 0 9 -is today frequently
stipulated in the arbitration clauses of BITs. Whereas in this context,
however, the existence of a respective legal entitlement depends largely
upon the specific wording of the arbitration clauses of the individual
BIT in question, 110 an increasing number of other international
agreements also include a binding consent of the contracting parties to
investor-state arbitration. In the realm of regional economic integration
agreements, Article 1122 of NAFTA, the Articles 10.17 and following of
the Central America-Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement
(CAFTA-DR), Article 6.21 (4) of the Comprehensive Economic
Cooperation Agreement between India and Singapore, Articles 32 and
following of the ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement, and
Article 10.16 of the United States-Oman Free Trade Agreement serve as
notable examples in this regard. The same applies at the multilateral-
sectoral level to Article 26(3)(a) of the Energy Charter Treaty, which
stipulates in connection with mixed settlements of investment disputes
that "each Contracting Party hereby gives its unconditional consent to
the submission of a dispute to international arbitration or
conciliation.""' The in principal unconditional recognition of a right to
initiate investment arbitration proceedings against the host state
creates a clear international legal entitlement for private investors like
TNCs, thus "marking another step in their transition from objects to
subjects of international law."112
109. See, e.g., BG Group Plc. v. Argentina, UNCITRAL, Final Award, 145 (Dec. 24,
2007) ("The proliferation of bilateral investment treaties has effected a profound
transformation of international investment law. Most significantly, under these
instruments investors are entitled to seek enforcement of their treaty rights by directly
bringing action against the State in whose territory they have invested.") (emphasis
added); Elihu Lauterpacht, International Law and Private Foreign Investment, 4 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 259, 274 (1997); Ole Spiermann, Individual Rights, State Interests
and the Power to Waive ICSID Jurisdiction under Bilateral Investment Treaties, 20 ARB.
INT'L 179, 185 (2004). However, this view is far from undisputed. See, e.g., DOUGLAS, supra
note 1, at 10-38 (discussing the respective doctrinal debate).
110. DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 4, at 242. Please note, however, in this context
also the potentially relevant issue of a possible procedural dimension of the most-favored-
nation clauses stipulated in BITs. Generally on this controversially debated question, see,
for example, Guido Santiago Tawil, Most Favored Nation Clauses and Jurisdictional
Clauses in Investment Treaty Arbitration, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW FOR THE
21sT CENTURY - ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, supra note 100, at 9.
111. Energy Charter Treaty art. 26(3)(a), Dec. 12, 1994, 2080 U.N.T.S. 100.
112. See Plama Consortium Ltd. v. Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, Decision on
Jurisdiction, 1 141 (Feb. 8, 2005) (describing the legal regime established by the Energy
Charter Treaty) ("For all these reasons, Article 26 ECT provides to a covered investor an
almost unprecedented remedy for its claim against a host state. . . . By any standards,
Article 26 is a very important feature of the ECT which is itself a very significant treaty
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III. INFORMAL VS. NORMATIVELY RECOGNIZED STEERING SUBJECTS:
PATHS TO BE TAKEN
It is admittedly always difficult to measure the particular political
influence TNCs exercise in specific regulatory activities at the domestic
as well as international level. Nevertheless, the present analysis of two
reference fields of IEL congruently indicates that these nonstate actors
occupy an increasingly important position as steering subjects in the
WTO legal order as well as in the international legal framework on the
protection of foreign investments, thereby contributing to the "inherent
heterogeneity of modern partnerships in international law making and
international law adjudication."'1 3
A. Factors Contributing to the Importance of TNCs as Steering Subjects
in IEL
The reasons for the growing involvement of TNCs in the respective
normative steering processes are manifold. In addition to their often
great economic importance, which is generally recognized as a notable
source of political influence, attention must be drawn, inter alia, to the
growing awareness among states and other international actors of the
advantages resulting from cooperative law-making and law-realization
processes114 as well as to the overall more positive attitude of states and
international organizations toward the activities of TNCs."15
Furthermore, prominently among these reasons are the various
processes of globalization, appropriately defined as the
"denationalization of clusters of political, economic and social
activities,"" 6 which have led to an at least partial loss by states of their
previously held steering capacity.117 As a consequence, states are
for investors, marking another step in their transition from objects to subjects of
international law."); CHRISTIAN TIETJE, THE APPLICABILITY OF THE ENERGY CHARTER
TREATY IN ICSID ARBITRATION OF EU NATIONALS vs. EU MEMBER STATES 13 (2008).
113. Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Proliferation of Actors, in DEVELOPMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW IN TREATY MAKING 537, 541 (Riudiger Wolfrum & Volker Raben eds., 2005).
114. See NOWROT, supra note 12, at 444-47, 469-73.
115. See generally, e.g., SANDRINE TESNER WITH GEORG KELL, THE UNITED NATIONS AND
BUSINESS: PARTNERSHIP RECOVERED (2000).
116. Jost Delbruck, Globalization of Law, Politics, and Markets-Implications for
Domestic Law-A European Perspective, 1 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 9, 11 (1993)
(emphasis omitted). For a related definition, see Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Globalization,
Democracy, and the Need for a New Administrative Law, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1687, 1693-94
(2002).
117. See, e.g., David P. Fidler, The Globalization of Public Health: Emerging Infectious
Diseases and International Relations, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 11, 14 (1997);
Stephan Hobe, The Era of Globalisation as a Challenge to International Law, 40 DUQ. L.
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increasingly required to create and participate in formal and informal
cooperative mechanisms with not just other states and international
organizations, but also with influential nonstate actors such as NGOs,
business associations, trade unions, and, last but not least, TNCs in
order to provide an effective regulatory scheme for the political,
economic, ecological, and social processes they are unable to control and
channel when acting alone. 18 Thereby, it is not argued that states are
no longer of importance in the international economic system or even
about to "wither away." Overall, they still remain very influential actors
on the international scene. However, under the influence of
globalization, states are increasingly incorporated in the multilayered
scheme of global economic governance, and their position in these
regulatory processes sometimes cannot even be characterized as being
primus inter pares.
B. WTO Legal Order us. International Investment Law: Approaches to
an Assessment of Two Competing Modi Operandi
.While all these and other factors contribute to the notable role TNCs
play in the WTO legal order and international investment law, the
present analysis, however, also reveals that these two fields of IEL are
characterized by two overall fundamentally different approaches to the
involvement of these nonstate actors in the respective regulatory
processes. Whereas on the one side, in the multilateral regime on trade
in goods and services, TNCs usually do not enjoy any recognized legal
status and are thus largely confined to informal means. international
investment law, on the other side, not only provides for various venues
of direct involvement in the law-making and dispute settlement
processes, but also contributes to the emerging recognition of TNCs as
at least partial subjects of international law.
In light of these two competing approaches to the status of TNCs as
steering subjects in IEL, the question arises as to which of them is
preferable to provide a generally more suitable role model for the future
incorporation of these private entities in the regulatory practice of the
international economic system. Thereby, it is worth recalling that both
modi operandi appear to have-in state practice as well as in
academia-their supporters, but also their fair share of opponents.
REv. 655, 656 (2002); John H. Jackson, Sovereignty-Modern: A New Approach to an
Outdated Concept, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 782, 784, 799 (2003).
118. Concerning the increasing need for these kinds of cooperative regulatory efforts,
see, for example, Jost Delbruick, Transnational Federalism: Problems and Prospects of
Allocating Public Authority Beyond the State, 11 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STuD. 31, 32-47
(2004).
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While the quite restrictive approach adopted by the WTO has been
frequently criticized as, inter alia, mirroring an institutional system and
culture that "do not fit into an international economic system shaped by
globalization" and thus being unable "to cope with the challenges of
today,"119 it is nevertheless apparently in conformity with the view of a
considerable majority of WTO members on this issue. Quite similar
divergent perceptions can be found with regard to the approaches
adopted in the realm of international investment law. Whereas the
present, predominant practice clearly promotes the direct participation
of TNCs, especially in the field of investment arbitration, the respective
legal developments have in particular more recently also given rise to
concerns in policy fora and in the literature for example with regard to
an alleged bias of the current normative framework in favor of private
investors and-closely related-concerns of undue restrictions on the
host state's regulatory autonomy in furtherance of other public
interests. 120 In addition and even more notably, there are by now clear
indications in state practice that international investment law as a
whole, or at least with regard to certain aspects, has become-again-
increasingly controversial. 121 This applies in particular-albeit by far
not exclusively-to a number of Latin American countries' display of
119. Christian Tietje, The Effect of Globalization on International Economic Law, in
GLOBALISATION - THE STATE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 43, 45 (Stephan Hobe ed., 2009)
("The thus broadened perspective on law making and implementation in international
economic law, however, contrasts with approaches taken within the WTO. . . . Moreover,
the entire WTO is built on the practice and culture of the old GATT 1947 which played its
role in the old international system on the basis of a concept of a small club of trading
powers, namely the US and the EU, ruling the system. However, the days of the old GATT
1947 are gone; the former bi-polar system has been replaced by a multi-polar system of
different important actors - states, civil society and transnational corporations - and a
multitude of interests. The institutional system of the WTO and its entire culture do not
fit into an international economic system shaped by globalization. It is obvious that a
system built on ideas of the Post-World War II era is not able to cope with the challenges
of today - but this is exactly the situation with regard to the WTO."); see also Joost
Pauwelyn, New Trade Politics for the 21st Century, 11 J. INVL ECON. L. 559, 572 (2008);
Debra P. Steger, The Future of the WTO: The Case for Institutional Reform, 12 J. IN'L
ECON. L. 803, 831 (2009).
120. See Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights
and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, Business and Human
Rights: Further Steps towards the Operationalization of the 'Protect, Respect and Remedy"
Framework, 1 20-25, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/27 (April 9, 2010); Gus Van Harten, Perceived
Bias in Investment Treaty Arbitration, in THE BACKLASH AGAINST INVESTMENT
ARBITRATION 433 (Michael Waibel et al. eds., 2010).
121. See, e.g., Christoph Schreuer, Introduction to INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW IN
CONTEXT 3, 5 (August Reinisch & Christina Knahr eds., 2007); KARSTEN NOWROT,
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND THE REPUBLIC OF ECUADOR: FROM ARBITRAL
BILATERALISM TO JUDICIAL REGIONALISM 5-24 (2010).
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recently renewed suspicion that found its expression, inter alia, in the
denunciations of the ICSID Convention by Bolivia in 2007 and by
Ecuador in 2009.122
Aside from the controversial suitability of both approaches, another
aspect to be taken into account concerns the general differences between
the economic transactions addressed by world trade law and
international investment law, respectively. For example, as Christoph
Schreuer and Rudolf Dolzer point out, "[m]aking a foreign investment is
different in nature from engaging in a trade transaction. Whereas a
trade deal typically consists in a one-time exchange of goods and money,
the decision to invest in a foreign country initiates a long-term
relationship between the investor and the host country."123 It appears
not too far-fetched to presume that the more direct involvement of
investors, such as TNCs, and the resulting "triangle relationship"
comprised of the investor, its home state, and its host state as being
characteristic of international investment law can also be attributed to
the specific business nature of foreign investments as compared to trade
in goods and services. 124
Although there seems to be-thus-as is frequently the case-no
simple and straightforward generalized answer to the question as to
which of the two competing approaches to the status of TNCs as
steering subjects appears to be preferable, the remaining part of this
article will nevertheless attempt to provide a respective assessment
based on some broader conceptual thoughts. Thereby, in order to at
least largely avoid the problems connected with a legal policy
argumentation that is inevitably influenced by subjective points of view,
it should be recalled that an "objective" evaluation cannot be
undertaken in an abstract, unconnected sense. Rather, it requires
recourse to a superordinate normative focal point in light of whose
requirements and expectations the evaluation is made, thereby at the
122. For further discussion of this, as well as the controversially debated legal
implications of such a denunciation, see, for example, Christoph Schreuer, Denunciation of
the ICSID Convention and Consent to Arbitration, in THE BACKLASH AGAINST INVESTMENT
ARBITRATION: PERCEPTIONS AND REALITY, supra note 94, at 353; TIETJE, NOWROT &
WACKERNAGEL, supra note 97, at 5-32; Oscar M. Garibaldi, On the Denunciation of the
ICSID Convention, Consent to ICSID Jurisdiction, and the Limits of the Contract Analogy,
in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF
CHRISTOPH SCHREUER 251 (Christina Binder et al. eds., 2009); NOWROT, supra note 121,
at 5-8, 24-27.
123. DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 4, at 3.
124. However, with that said, it must be recalled that the WTO legal order, in particular
with regard to its normative framework on trade in services, also covers respective direct
investments. See General Agreement on Trade in Services art. 1:2, lit. c, art. XXVIII, lit. d,
Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183, 33 I.L.M. 1167; e.g., Beviglia Zampetti & Sauv6, supra
note 78, at 254-57.
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same time providing for the necessary disclosure of the author's
respective preunderstanding (Vorverstlindnis). Against this background,
it is submitted that the normative "guiding vision"125 of an emerging
transnational economic community offers an appropriate-and in light
of the current state of the global economic order and its legal
framework, also realistic-overarching concept for an assessment of the
divergent approaches in the WTO legal order and international
investment law.
C. The Emerging Transnational Economic Community as a Normative
"Guiding Vision"
In order to evaluate and illustrate the potential of the idea of an
emerging transnational economic community as a normative guiding
vision in the present context, the following analysis is divided into two
main sections. The first part is devoted to an assessment of the value-
orientation of IEL as having more recently evolved as one of the main
characteristics of this area of law. Based on the findings made in this
first part, the second part provides some broader conceptual ideas on
the adequate incorporation of TNCs as steering subjects in IEL.
1. Economic System or Economic Community?: The Value-
Orientation of IEL
It is generally recognized that states and an increasing variety of
other actors in the international realm presently form an international
system, in the sense that the actors have sufficient contact with each
other and adequate impact on their decisions to act as parts of a
whole.126 The same applies to the existence of an international economic
system (or subsystem) as an inherent component of this international
system.127 However, taking into account that a respective international
(economic) system can also be a mere agglomeration of mechanically
interacting units,128 it is still debated whether the current international
125. See generally Vo~kuhle, supra note 13, at 134-38 (discussing the recourse to
"guiding visions" as a dogmatic approach in legal science).
126. See, e.g., Stanley Hoffmann, International Systems and International Law, in THE
INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM: THEORETICAL ESSAYS 205 (Klaus Knorr & Sidney Verba eds.,
1961).
127. See Christian Tietje, Begriff, Geschichte and Grundlagen des Internationalen
Wirtschaftssystems und Wirtschaftsrechts, in INTERNATIONALES WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 1, 3-5
(Christian Tietje ed., 2009).
128. See HEDLEY BULL, THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY: A STUDY OF ORDER IN WORLD
POLITICS 13-14 (1977).
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system has also evolved toward an international community in a
substantive sense or whether this frequently applied term "remains
essentially a tool of political rhetoric."129 It is obviously beyond the scope
of this article to engage in a more comprehensive discussion of this
issue. 30 However, there is substantial agreement that the existence of
an international community presupposes as one of its central elements
the recognition of "certain common interests and common values"
among its members, who consequently believe "themselves to be bound
by a common set of rules in their relations with one another."1 3'
In this regard, it is worth drawing attention to the frequently
highlighted perception that the international legal framework has
undergone quite substantial changes over the past few decades. While
previously comprising basically a set of rules-often merely of a
procedural nature-which limited and guided states as the sole subjects
of international law in their interactions with each other, international
law has more recently transformed into what has already been called "a
comprehensive blueprint of social life"132 and the evolution of a "world
(internal) law." 33 In the course of this process, the international legal
order is more and more independent of the will and interests of
individual states, with its substantive norms increasingly focusing on
the realization of community interests.134
These observations regarding the changing normative structure of
the international system as a whole are also applicable to the global
129. Christian Tomuschat, Obligations Arising for States Without or Against Their Will,
in 241 RECUEIL DES COURS 195, 232 (1993).
130. See, e.g., Andreas Fischer-Lescano & Gunther Teubner, Regime-Collisions: The
Vain Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 999,
1004 (Michelle Everson trans., 2004); Andreas L. Paulus, The Emergence of the
International Community and the Divide between International and Domestic Law, in
NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE DIVIDE BETWEEN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 216
(Janne Nijman & Andr6 Nollkaemper eds., 2007); Bruno Simma, From Bilateralism to
Community Interest in International Law, in 250 RECUEIL DES COURS 217, 243-48 (1994);
Gunther Teubner, Societal Constitutionalism: Alternatives to State-Centred Constitutional
Theory?, in TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE AND CONSTITuTIONALISM 3 (Christian Joerges
et al. eds., 2004).
131. BULL, supra note 128, at 13; see also, e.g., JAN KLABBERS ET AL., THE
CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 153 (2009); Simma, supra note 130, at
245; Christian Tomuschat, International Law: Ensuring the Survival of Mankind on the
Eve of a New Century, in 281 RECUEIL DES COURS 9, 77-78 (1999).
132. Tomuschat, supra note 131, at 63.
133. Jost Delbriick, Prospects for a 'World (Internal) Law?" Legal Developments in a
Changing International System, 9 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 401 (2002).
134. See, e.g., Simma, supra note 130, at 229-43 and passim; Jost Delbruck, 'Laws in the
Public Interest"-Some Observations on the Foundations and Identification of erga omnes
Norms in International Law, in LIBER AMICORUM GONTHER JAENICKE 17 (Volkmar Gbtz et
al. eds., 1998); NOWROT, supra note 12, at 486-96.
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economic system and its legal order. Aside from taking recourse to the
topos quidquid de omnibus valet, valet etiam de quibusdam et singulis
(in the present context: whatever applies to the general level, also
applies to its subdivisions), the growing value orientation of IEL is
supported by the current discussion about the possibility of qualifying
certain normative ordering principles of the global economic system-
among them the principles of open markets and free trade as well as the
stability of the international financial markets-themselves as
overarching community interests.135 In addition, the fact that IEL is
increasingly confronted with the challenge of how to incorporate
noneconomic concerns, like the protection of human rights and the
environment as well as the enforcement of core labor and social
standards, into its normative scheme serves as a further indication in
this regard. For example, the respective debates focus not only on the
WTO legal order no longer being interpreted "in clinical isolation from
public international law" 36 -contrary to the "fire-wall approach" that
dominated the GATT 1947-and on the activities of key international
financial institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and
the World Bank.137 Rather, the need for finding an adequate balance
between conflicting private and community interests is in particular
also increasingly recognized in the realm of international investment
law. 38
Finally, the value orientation of IEL can be normatively based on a
systematic interpretation of Articles 55, 56, and 103 of the U.N.
Charter. According to Article 103, the obligations of the members of the
United Nations under the Charter prevail over the obligations of these
states under any other international agreement. Contrary to its
restrictive wording, this provision's scope of application-in light of its
objective and purpose-is not limited to other obligations contained in
treaties, but also covers obligations deriving from any other
135. See, e.g., NOWROT, supra note 12, at 497-500; Gregory Shaffer, Recognizing Global
Public Goods in WTO Dispute Settlement: Who Participates? Who Decides?: The Case of
Trips and Pharmaceutical Patent Protection, 7 J. INT'L ECON. L. 459, 462-63 (2004).
136. Appellate Body Report, United States-Standards for Reformulated and
Conventional Gasoline, 17, WT/DS2/ABIR (Apr. 29, 1996); see also, e.g., Jeffery Atik, Trade
and Health, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 38, at 597;
Lorand Bartels, Trade and Human Rights, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL
TRADE LAW, supra note 38, at 571; Daniel Bodansky & Jessica C. Lawrence, Trade and
Environment, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 38, at
505; Gabrielle Marceau, Trade and Labour, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL
TRADE LAW, supra note 38, at 539; Hunter Nottage, Trade and Development, in OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 38, at 481.
137. See generally, e.g., SIGRUN I. SKOGLY, THE HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF THE
WORLD BANK AND THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (2001).
138. See NOWROT, supra note 121, at 17-24, 33-41.
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international legal sources, such as customary international law. 13 9
Among these Charter obligations in the sense of Article 103 are also the
various duties to cooperate that are listed in Articles 55 and 56 of the
U.N. Charter that, when read together, are intended to contribute to the
realization of community interests.140 Consequently, in light of Article
103, the normative structure of the international economic system must
also be interpreted in a way that gives effect to the obligations to protect
and promote the community interests as stipulated in Articles 55 and 56
of the U.N. Charter.141
Considering this value orientation of IEL as a normative framework
that increasingly focuses on the realization of generally recognized
community interests or global public goods, it can be argued that the
international economic system is currently in the phase of transforming
into a transnational economic community. Thereby, the use of the term
"transnational" is to be favored in particular to the word "international."
Whereas "internationalization" refers to the process of institutionalized
cooperation between states which started already in the nineteenth
century,142 the term "transnational"--deeply inspired by the superb and
foresighted 1956 study Transnational Law by Philip C. Jessupl 43 -
rightly conveys the notion that the current regulatory reality in the
economic realm comprises an interconnected plurality of various
normatively relevant steering mechanisms, which have frequently been
139. See Rudolf Bernhardt, Article 103, in 2 THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS-A
COMMENTARY 1292, 1298-99 (Bruno Simma et al. eds., 2d ed. 2002); Rep. of the Study Grp.
of the Int'l Law Comm'n, 58th Sess, May 1-Jun. 9, Jul. 3-Aug. 11, 2006, 11 344-45, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (Apr. 13, 2006).
140. For a comprehensive analysis of the obligations stipulated in these provisions, see
Eibe Riedel, Article 55(c), in 2 THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS-A COMMENTARY,
supra note 139, at 917-41; Riudiger Wolfrum, Articles 55(a) and (b), in 2 THE CHARTER OF
THE UNITED NATIONS-A COMMENTARY, supra note 139, at 897-917; Ruidiger Wolfrum,
Article 56, in 2 THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS-A COMMENTARY, supra note 139,
at 941-44.
141. See KARSTEN NOWROT & YVONNE WARDIN, LIBERALISIERUNG DER
WASSERVERSORGUNG IN DER WTO-RECHTSORDNUNG: DIE VERWIRKLICHUNG DES
MENSCHENRECHTS AUF WASSER ALS AUFGABE EINER TRANSNATIONALEN
VERANTWORTUNGSGEMEINScHAFT 47 (2003); Tietje, supra note 127, at 58.
142. See, e.g., Jost Delbrack, The Role of the United Nations in Dealing with Global
Problems, 4 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 277, 277-78 & n.3 (1997).
143. PHILIP C. JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAW (1956); see also GRALF-PETER CALLIESS &
PEER ZUMBANSEN, ROUGH CONSENSUS AND RUNNING CODE: A THEORY OF TRANSNATIONAL
PRIVATE LAW 11-26 and passim (2010) (discussing broader recent perspectives on this
concept); Tietje & Nowrot, supra note 12, at 26-31 (discussing Jessup's understanding of
transnational law).
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attributed to and indeed are reflecting processes of normative
transnationalization.144
2. Normative Consequences for the Status of TNCs as Steering
Subjects in IEL
In light of this emerging transnational economic community
orientated toward the realization of the common good and its underlying
requirements and expectations, it is now possible to provide some
broader conceptual ideas on the adequate incorporation of TNCs as
steering subjects in IEL. In the following, three respective aspects
frequently and rightly associated with this normative guiding vision-
the issues of inclusiveness, transparency, and responsibility-will be
addressed in this regard.
a. Inclusiveness
A first characteristic often linked to the concept of a transnational
community is the inclusiveness of its regulatory processes. 145 In this
context, it is in particular an optimal balancing and allocation of
community interests146 as constituting one of the primary aims of a
transnational economic community that presupposes an opportunity for
all powerful, affected, and interested actors-governmental as well as
nongovernmental-to take part in the respective law-making and law-
realization processes.
The inclusive approach serves three main purposes. First, it opens
up the possibility to benefit from the information and expertise-
generally regarded as a central prerequisite for balanced and effective
regulation-of the various categories of actors, including TNCs. 147
144. See, e.g., Christian Tietje, Transnationales Wirtschaftsrecht aus offentlich-
rechtlicher Perspektive, 101 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR VERGLEICHENDE RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT 404
(2002).
145. See, e.g., KLABBERS ET AL., supra note 131, at 153 ('The concept of an international
community suggests inclusiveness and therefore tends to favour rather than to hinder the
inclusion of non-state actors.").
146. On the realization of the common good as a normative principle in the sense of an
optimization imperative, see Josef Isensee, Konkretisierung des Gemeinwohls in der
freiheitlichen Demokratie, in GEMEINWOHLGEFAHRDUNG UND GEHMEINWOHLSICHERUNG
95, 105 (Hans Herbert von Arnim & Karl-Peter Sommermann eds., 2004). On the
underlying distinction between rules and principles, see generally RONALD DWORKIN,
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977); ROBERT ALEXY, A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
(Julian Rivers trans., 2002).
147. See generally, e.g., Walter Mattli & Ngaire Woods, In Whose Benefit? Explaining
Regulatory Change in Global Politics, in THE POLITICS OF GLOBAL REGULATION 1, 4
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Second, normative steering processes that are governed by the principle
of inclusiveness enjoy, in most cases, a considerably higher degree of
acceptance among the addressees of these rules of behavior, thus
diminishing the risk of enforcement deficits.14 8 Finally, the
incorporation of TNCs and other nonstate entities in the regulatory
processes-in particular in light of the also in this context reduced
steering capacity of states-reflects the increasingly perceived necessity
of an overarching cooperative and, thus, inclusive approach toward the
realization of community interests at the global level.149
Against this background, it becomes apparent that the
comparatively restrictive approach adopted by the WTO with regard to
the participation of nonstate actors indeed still leaves certain room for
improvements. However, also the current inclusiveness of the
regulatory practice in international investment law has been subject to
criticism. In this context, the respective calls for enhanced participation
are mostly not related to the role of TNCs or other business actors.
Rather, they are focusing on the possibilities for other categories of
private actors, in particular NGOs, to take part in the law-making
processes and, especially, in the investment arbitration proceedings.15 0
A number of recent developments in international investment law
may serve as an indication for a more inclusive approach. In relation to
the law-making processes, a number of states have initiated written
consultation processes and public hearings in particular in connection
with the drafting and revision of model BITs. The consultation processes
in connection with the Norwegian draft model BIT in 2008, the U.S.
model BIT review in June and July 2009 as well as the South African
"Bilateral Investment Treaty Policy Framework Review" in July 2009
(Walter Mattli & Ngaire Woods eds., 2009) (discussing the connection between the optimal
realization of the common good and the need for inclusive governance processes).
Specifically on the need for the expertise and information provided by non-state or
business actors in the decision and law-making processes of the international economic
system, see KLABBERS ET AL., supra note 131, at 255; NOWROT, supra note 12, at 444-47,
635-39.
148. On the connection between participation in law-making processes and the reduced
risk of enforcement deficits, see KLABBERS ET AL., supra note 131, at 255; TULLY, supra
note 12, at 305.
149. On this perception, see, for example, Delbriuck, supra note 118, at 32-34; NOWROT,
supra note 12, at 504-09; Tietje, supra note 127, at 59.
150. See, e.g., Francesco Francioni, Access to Justice, Denial of Justice, and
International Investment Law, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW
AND ARBITRATION 63, 71-77 (Pierre-Marie Dupuy et al. eds., 2009); Amokura Kawharu,
Participation of Non-Governmental Organizations in Investment Arbitration as Amici
Curiae, in THE BACKLASH AGAINST INVESTMENT ARBITRATION 275 (Michael Waibel et al.
eds., 2010).
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serve as vivid examples in this regard. 151 In the realm of investment
arbitration, it is in particular the possibility to submit amicus curiae
briefs that has gained some prominence in recent years. In addition to
respective stipulations in a number of bilateral and regional agreements
like NAFTA, Article 10.20(3) of the CAFTA-DR or Article 15.19(3) of the
United States-Singapore Free Trade Agreement, also ICSID is now--on
the basis of its reformed Arbitration Rules that entered into force on
April 10, 2006-explicitly recognizing the competence of tribunals to
allow for the submission of amicus curiae briefs by interested
nondisputing parties.152
b. Transparency
A second important procedural aspect-albeit connected to the issue
of inclusiveness-which bears a close relationship to the concept of a
transnational economic community orientated toward the realization of
the common good, concerns the transparency of the decision-making and
dispute settlement processes. 53 The overarching principle of
transparency or publicity serves a variety of purposes in the domestic
and international realm, which cannot be dealt with in detail here. 154
Specifically with regard to the optimal promotion and protection of
community interests, its function is essentially twofold. On the one side,
nonsecretive, open steering mechanisms benefit from an increased
151. The Norwegian draft model BIT was first published in December 2007. The project,
however, was shelved in June 2009. See Damon Vis-Dunbar, Norway Shelves its Proposed
Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, INV. TREATY NEWS, 7 (June 2009), http://www.iisd.org/
itn/wp-content/uploads/2009/06/ITN-June-2009.pdf. On the consultation processes
initiated by the United States and South Africa, see Damon Vis-Dunbar, South African
Trade Department Critical of Approach Taken to BIT-Making, INV. TREATY NEWS, 2 (July
2009), http://www.iisd.org/itn/wp-content/uploads/2009/08/ITN-July-2009.pdf; Elisabeth
Whitsitt, United States Trade Representative and State Department Hold Public Hearing
and Solicit Written Comments in US Model BIT Review, INV. TREATY NEWS, 4 (Sept.
2009), http://www.iisd.org/itn/wp-content/uploads/2009/09/ITNSeptember2009.pdf.
152. On these developments, see, for example, SCHREUER ET AL., supra note 106, at 704-
07; Epaminontas E. Triantafilou, Amicus Submissions in Investor-State Arbitration after
Suez v. Argentina, 24 ARB. INT'L 571, 583-86 (2008).
153. See generally KLABBERS ET AL., supra note 131, at 326-30. On an emerging "general
legal principle of openness" stipulating that "global governance fora are no longer
presumed to be a priori closed," see id., at 222. Specifically on the notion and importance
of transparency in IEL, see, for example, Carl-Sebastian Zoellner, Third-Party
Participation (NGO's and Private Persons) and Transparency in ICSID Proceedings, in
THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE SETILEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES (ICSID):
TAKING STOCK AFTER 40 YEARS 179, 181-85, 198-207 (Rainer Hofmann & Christian J.
Tams eds., 2007).
154. See, e.g., Daniel C. Esty, Good Governance at the World Trade Organization:
Building a Foundation of Administrative Law, 10 J. INT'L ECON. L. 509, 524-25 (2007).
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acceptance among the actors concerned, thereby further reducing the
risk of noncompliance. 55 On the other side, it is only on the basis of
transparent deliberations that an optimal participation of all relevant
actors can be effectively ensured.
In light of these and other important purposes served by the
principle of transparency, it is hardly surprising that the regulatory
practice of the WTO as well as of international investment law has been
often criticized for being overly secretive. 156 Thereby, it is-again-not
primarily the status of TNCs and other business entities, but first and
foremost of individuals and other nonstate actors, on which the
respective discourses on enhanced transparency focus. While in
particular the decision-making processes and treaty negotiations have
largely retained their confidential character in the realms of world trade
and international investment law, there are certain indications that the
principle of transparency is more recently gaining ground with regard to
dispute settlement in both areas of IEL. Since 2005, WTO panels as well
as the Appellate Body recognize the possibility of open hearings if both
parties request public access. 157 In addition, in the field of investor-state
arbitration-originally largely modeled on the concept of private
commercial arbitration and thus traditionally dominated by the
principle of confidentiality-a number of recent developments in
particular on the basis of agreements to which the United States is a
party, but also in the realm of ICSID, underline the increasingly
recognized importance of transparency in all regulatory processes of
IEL."5s
155. On the overall increased acceptance of the need for transparent normative steering
processes in the international system, see, for example, Jost Delbruck, Exercising Public
Authority Beyond the State: Transnational Democracy and/or Alternative Legitimation
Strategies?, 10 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 29, 42-43 (2003); Paul B. Stephan,
Accountability and International Lawmaking: Rules, Rents and Legitimacy, 17 Nw. J.
INT'L L. & Bus. 681, 726-29 (1996-97).
156. On the respective discussions regarding WTO transparency see, for example, Julio
A. Larcarte, Transparency, Public Debate and Participation by NGOs in the WTO: A WTO
Perspective, 7 J. INT'L EcON. L. 683 (2004). Concerning a similar perception, with regard to
international investment law, see Special Rep. of the Secretary-General on the Issue of
Human Rights and Transnational Corp. and other Bus. Enter., Business and Human
Rights: Towards Operationalizing the "Protect, Respect and Remedy" Framework, T 34,
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/11/13 (Apr. 22, 2009); Barnali Choudhury, Recapturing Public Power: Is
Investment Arbitration's Engagement of the Public Interest Contributing to the Democratic
Deficit?, 41 VAND. J. TRANsNAT'L L. 775 (2008) (arguing that the lack of public
participation limits the efficacy of investment arbitration decisions on public interest
issues).
157. Lothar Ehring, Public Access to Dispute Settlement Hearings in the World Trade
Organization, 11 J. INT'L EcON. L. 1021, 1030 (2008).
158. On the at least partial relativization of the principle of confidentiality in investor-
state arbitration, see, for example, SCHREUER ET AL., supra note 106, at 697-704, 834-39;
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c. Responsibility
Finally, the third notable-and the most controversial-
consequence of an emerging transnational economic community aimed
at the realization of community interests concerns the issue of
responsibility. The importance attached to responsibility is based on the
perception that an optimal promotion and protection of community
interests presupposes that all influential actors participating in the law-
making and law-realization processes in the international (economic)
system develop and share a sense of responsibility for the common
good.159 Although it has frequently-and rightly-been emphasized that
the pursuit of individual or sectoral interests and the realization of the
common good are, in principle, far from mutually exclusive, it is
nevertheless equally certain that the orientation toward profit
maximization as one of the primary motives of the activities of TNCs-
in the same way as the frequent "single-issue orientation" of NGOs-
does not always guarantee in itself that their TNC participation in the
regulatory processes adequately contributes to the promotion of
community interests.16 0 Indeed, it is precisely this concern for the
optimal realization of the common good that has frequently been
brought forward against the considerable influence exercised by
powerful nonstate actors like TNCs and NGOs on the transnational
steering processes in the absence of respective corresponding
accountability mechanisms. 161
In light of these findings, it becomes apparent that the intensively
debated issue on the need and possibilities for making TNCs responsible
for the promotion and protection of community interests relates to more
than their economic activities, although the literature usually focuses
primarily on this aspect. Rather, it is also clearly connected to the
Joachim Delaney & Daniel Barstow Magraw, Procedural Transparency, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW, supra note 84, at 721: Zoellner, supra
note 153, at 181-98.
159. See generally, e.g., WALTER VAN GERVEN, THE EUROPEAN UNION: A POLITY OF
STATES AND PEOPLES 213-14 (2005) (discussing the need for a respective sense of
responsibility for the public good among all participants of governance processes).
160. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, The Governance Triangle:
Regulatory Standards Institutions and the Shadow of the State, in THE POLITICS OF
GLOBAL REGULATION 44, 59-62 (Walter Mattli & Ngaire Woods eds., 2009).
161. KLABBERS ET AL., supra note 131, at 156 ("On the other hand, the irregular
international status of corporations, and also of NGOs, is pernicious because it leaves
space for the exploitation of their power for self-interested goals to the detriment of the
public good and of affected individuals."). See also id., at 250-51 ("[B]usiness does not yet
and should not acquire any legitimate expectation to participate in international law-
making unless the business actors specifically demonstrate their commitment to the
public interest. . . ."). See generally NOWROT, supra note 12, at 475-82, 606-14.
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status of TNCs as political actors based on their participation in the
regulatory practice of IEL.162 Thereby, it is neither possible nor
necessary to engage here in a more in-depth assessment on whether,
and, if so, by which means and on the basis of which concepts, TNCs-
but potentially also international NGOs163-should be integrated into
the international legal order as addressees of respective obligations.16 4
For the purposes of this analysis, it appears sufficient to recall that, at
least on the basis of soft law as well as the numerous evolving private
regulatory regimes, there are undoubtedly indications that TNCs are
increasingly expected to respect and contribute to the promotion of
community interests in the course of their activities as economic and
political actors.165 These developments support the present proposition
that the various members of the emerging transnational economic
community essentially also form a transnational community of
responsibility. 166
162. On the role of TNCs as political actors in light of their participation in the
regulatory practices of the international economic system, see ANNEGRET FLOHR ET AL.,
THE ROLE OF BUSINESS IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: CORPORATIONS AS NORM-
ENTREPRENEURS 6 and passim (2010). On the resulting responsibilities of these actors, see
id. at 8 ("However, these emerging patterns of 'business as partner' in governance also
raise questions about the extent to which and under which conditions corporations take on
responsibility to serve the public interest and provide public goods.").
163. See generally Nowrot, supra note 36, at 589-641 (discussing the need for a legal
regulatory framework, why NGOs should be legal subjects of international law, and how
to legally construct limitations on NGOs).
164. See, e.g., Karsten Nowrot, Reconceptualising International Legal Personality of
Influential Non-State Actors: Towards a Rebuttable Presumption of Normative
Responsibilities, 80 PHILIPPINE L. J. 563 (2006) (considering whether nonstate actors are
obligated to protect and promote international community interests); MUCHLINSKI, supra
note 3, at 473-574; JENNIFER A. ZERK, MULTINATIONALS AND CORPORATE SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY: LIMITATIONS AND OPPORTUNITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2006).
165. See, e.g., Larry CatA Backer, From Moral Obligation to International Law:
Disclosure Systems, Markets and the Regulation of Multinational Corporations, 39 GEO. J.
INT'L L. 591 (2008) (suggesting the creation of a global corporate stakeholder system for
disclosure and transparency by corporate actors); KARSTEN NOWROT, THE NEW
GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE OF THE GLOBAL COMPACT: TRANSFORMING A "LEARNING
NETWORK" INTO A FEDERALIZED AND PARLIAMENTARIZED TRANSNATIONAL REGULATORY
REGIME (2005) (arguing that creation of the U.N. Global Compact fundamentally alters
the steering philosophy into a mechanism by which global public goods can be promoted
and protected transnationally); John Gerard Ruggie, Business and Human Rights: The
Evolving International Agenda, 101 AM. J. INT'L L. 819 (2007) (concluding that
international law may regulate business and human rights but can be maximized by
increasing governance capacity globally).
166. On this perception, see, e.g., KLABBERS ET AL., supra note 131, at 261; NOWROT &
WARDIN, supra note 141, at 53-62; Tietje, supra note 127, at 59.
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CONCLUSION
While TNCs are, in general, often able to exercise considerable
influence on the law-making and law-realization processes in the
international economic system, this article illustrated that two of the
central areas of IEL-the WTO legal order and international
investment law-are characterized by two overall fundamentally
different approaches to the incorporation of this category of nonstate
actors as steering subjects in the respective regulatory mechanisms. In
this context, the normative guiding vision of an emerging transnational
economic community and its underlying requirements and expectations
justifies the conclusion that the more inclusive and formalized modus
operandi of the current international legal framework on foreign
investments more appropriately reflects the importance of TNCs as
economic and political actors in today's changing international system.
Despite international investment law thus providing the generally more
suitable role model for the future incorporation of these entities in the
regulatory processes of IEL, the need for certain adjustments does not
only apply to the WTO. Rather, the requirements of inclusiveness and
transparency also suggest-in relation to individuals and other private
actors-a demand for further respective improvements in particular in
the realm of investor-state arbitration. In addition, realizing the
normative idea of a transnational community of responsibility continues
to be an overarching task for all steering processes in the international
economic realm, most certainly including the WTO legal order and
international investment law.
In spite of this rising need for modifications, this article has, for a
variety of reasons, deliberately abstained from adding another tone to
the already large and many-voiced chorus of specific suggestions
concerning the future of the status of TNCs and other nonstate actors as
steering subjects in IEL. Nevertheless, also in this context, it is
submitted that the normative guiding vision of an emerging
transnational economic community in the sense of an inclusive,
transparent, and responsible regime aimed at the realization of the
common good provides a suitable analytical and conceptual framework
for the assessment of respective proposals and their implementation in
practice.
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